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Background: With the occurrence of the crisis in 2007, which caused the largest 
economic contraction since the Great Depression in the thirties, it has become 
evident that the previous understanding of strategies, effects and roles of monetary 
and fiscal policy should be redefined. Objectives: The aim of this paper is to illustrate 
a possible expected change in monetary and fiscal policy in developed market 
economies that could occur as a consequence of the Great Recession. 
Methods/Approach: The paper provides a comparative analysis of various primary 
economic variables related to the developed OECD countries, as well as the 
empirical testing of the selected theoretical assumptions. Results: The changes in 
monetary policy refer to the question of raising target inflation, considering a 
possible use of aggregate price level targeting and paying attention to the role of 
central banks in suppressing the formation of an asset bubble. The success of fiscal 
policy in attaining stabilization depends on the size of possible fiscal measures and 
creation of automatic stabilizers. Conclusions: For the most part, monetary and fiscal 
policies will still stay unchanged, although some segments of these policies need to 
be improved. 
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The seventies and the beginning of the eighties of the 20th century were known for 
distinct shocks which resulted in double-digit inflation and unemployment. However, 
the period from the early eighties until the beginning of the global economic crisis in 
mid-2007 was characterised by the emergence of relatively reassuring economic 
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absence of significant cyclical fluctuations, the merit for which most 
macroeconomists consider should be attributed to them. 
 The impression was that the mentioned consensus resulted in theoretical 
completion and practical confirmation of previous macroeconomic concepts, 
which is why many prominent economists, including Lucas and Bernanke, asserted 
that the cyclical trends of the economic growth are under control, and that the 
problem of depression prevention is solved. The confidence of macroeconomists 
was not undermined by occasional crises such as those in Japan in 1990, Mexico, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Korea in 1997, and Argentina in 2002. 
 However, after the great moderation, and with the outbreak of the crisis in August 
2007, it became clear that it is necessary to redefine previous concepts, strategies, 
and effects, i.e. the role of monetary and fiscal policy in the upcoming period. That 
is, because it became evident that the confidence of the holders of these two 
policies and their ability to successfully manage them in the direction of achieving 
the desired goals of economic policy is seriously undermined. 
 
Consequences of the Great Recession on the monetary 
policy strategy 
The pre-crisis decades of the 20th century were characterized  by the monetarists’ 
consensus, based on former theoretical and empirical research, which included the 
establishment of an entire set of the basic scientific principles which the holders of 
monetary policy adhered to, and thereby explained the success of monetary policy 
managing. The key principles extracted from the literature are the following: inflation 
is always and everywhere the monetary phenomenon, the price stability has the 
important benefit, there is no long-term trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, expectations have a crucial role in determining inflation and the 
impact of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, real interest rates should 
rise in case of inflation increase (Taylor’s rule), monetary policy is subjected to the 
problem of time inconsistency, the independence of the central bank helps further 
improvement of monetary policy efficiency, the strong nominal anchor is the prime 
factor for creating good monetary policy outcomes, financial disturbances play an 
important role in business cycles (Mishkin, 2007). On the other hand, a flexible 
inflation targeting which implies the central bank’s obligation to stabilize the inflation 
around the targeting level, and output around the natural level, represent the most 
commonly accepted monetary policy strategic framework. 
 The last economic crisis of 2007 (the Great Recession) caused many conceptual 
dilemmas, the first being the assumption that individual segments on which the 
theory of monetary policy rested should be revised, while there were views that the 
monetary policy needs a complete review. The crisis indicated that macroeconomic 
policy must have more objectives and more instruments at its disposal, but 
conducting relevant research aimed at getting the exact answer to the question 
which instrument should be directed towards achieving specific economic policy 
goals requires time. If the effect of the crisis on the monetary policy strategy, i.e. on 
flexible inflation targeting, is minutely observed, three questions (possible 
modifications) are well marked as the most common topics for discussion in the 
academic community. The outcome of the named discussion will essentially 
determine the future development of this strategic framework. 
 The first dilemma concerns the issue of central banks raising the inflation target 
level in order to improve its flexibility during the period of crisis. Proponents of 
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advocate their position by the assumption that lowering interest rates would create 
conditions for an expansive monetary policy. Expansive monetary policy would be 
used as a reaction not only to financial, but to other shocks which may arise. The 
second reason is the fact that the zero lower bound problem would be decreased 
by the abovementioned, since the crisis has shown that this problem is significantly 
more serious than it used to be considered (Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010). John 
William (2009) suggested in his recent studies that raising the inflation target from 2% 
to 4% on average, would increase the possibility of dealing with the zero lower 
bound problem, which causes considerable costs in terms of macroeconomic 
stabilization, while Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) plead the need for a higher 
average inflation as the way for the increase of real wages flexibility. 
 The insistence on raising the inflation target in the developed market economies is 
justified by data presented in Figure 1. Data indicate the presence of the ZLB 
problem immediately after dealing with the negative consequences of the Great 
Recession. In fact, the analysis of a series of data leads to the conclusion that the 
developed economies (especially Switzerland, the EU, the US and the UK), starting in 
2009, faced the impossibility of further lowering of interest rates, which quickly 
reached minimum levels, which further prevented the use of monetary policy for 
countercyclical purposes. This caused a significant increase in the cost of 
macroeconomic stabilization, which leads to the conclusion that raising the inflation 
target in a similar situation would be beneficial. 
 
Figure 1  
Short term interest rates in some developed OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database, September 2014. 
 
The second dilemma resulting from the economic crisis is more radical than the 
first one. It refers to the advice given by certain monetarists to take price-level 
targeting instead of inflation targeting as a target. Inflation expectations are 
considered to be reduced in that case, and they obtain the role of automatic 
stabilizers, which ultimately affects the stabilization of the inflation rate. The two 
modes mainly differ in the fact that in the aggregate price level mode the central 
bank agrees to make such adjustments in the price level of the planned dimensions 
in a given period, while in the inflation targeting mode the central bank responds to 
deviations of inflation from the targeted level, but does not respond to single 
changes in the price level. This, on the other hand, means that in the case of 
targeting the price level, the central bank must endeavour to correct targets 
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Proponents of the implementation of the aggregate price level targeting strategy 
refer to conclusions from the theoretic research realized in the late 90s and in the 
begging of 2000 (Ditmar, Gavin and Prescot (1999) and (2000); Vestin (2000) and 
(2006); Svensson (1999); Woodford (2002)) establishing that the selection of price 
levels as the monetary policy target results in less variation in output compared to the 
case of the inflation target. The implementation of this target is a sort of automatic 
stabilizer, as the negative shocks of aggregate demand have effects on 
expectations stabilization which stabilize the economy, a phenomenon which 
becomes more expressed as the shock is larger, as well as an effect on the zero 
lower bound problems. This means that the Great Recession, which made the zero 
lower bound problems more serious, suggests that the benefits from the 
implementation of the aggregate price level strategy are potentially greater than 
the costs which it generates.  
The advantage of this strategy is higher when the intensity of the shock is stronger. 
Analyzing data on the variation of the output in developed market economies of 
OECD countries in the period of coping with the major economic crisis, as shown in 
Figure 2, leads to the conclusion that in the given context, the application of the 
aggregate price level targeting would give greater flexibility to monetary policy, and 




Variability of real GDP in developed market economies 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database, September 2014. 
 
 On the other hand, Duc and Clerc (2010, p. 4), notice that the effects on inflation 
expectations will depend on several factors: the first one is the time of the adoption 
of the strategy on the aggregate price level, the second is related to the level of the 
price index which is targeted and how quickly public expectations on deviations 
from targets are eliminated. Another objection to this strategy in the literature, which 
Woodfod points out in particular, is that the acceptance of the strategy would 
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that whether the costs of moving to the price level target exceed the benefits of 
reducing the uncertainty of the long-term price level could not be claimed with 
certainty, so further research would be highly valuable in the attempt to provide the 
final answer. 
 The third dilemma, generated from the crisis refers to two issues. The first is related 
to the role of the asset price. The other has to do with the importance of financial 
stability for the entire monetary policy. The movement of the asset price has the 
impact on spending decisions of companies and households, making the so-called 
welfare effect and consequently influencing the price level.  
 Namely, during the pre-crisis period a consensus regarding the asset price existed, 
based on 3 principles, emphasizing a passive role of the central bank during the 
period of asset bubble formation, and encouraging the moral hazard at the same 
time:  
o The central bank should not target the asset price; 
o The central bank should not prick the asset bubble; 
o After the burst of a bubble the central bank should implement the strategy of 
injecting necessary liquidity, in order to avoid macroeconomic downfall (Issing, 
2009, p. 46). 
 The justification for the mentioned consensus is connected with the opinion that 
the central bank will not notice the bubble formation in time. Even if the central 
bank succeeded in the market, the central bank would notice the bubble before, 
and would not allow the bubble’s development which would influence its 
disappearance. The Federal Reserve System, for two years, firmly advocated the 
thesis that the central bank should implement a tougher monetary policy only in the 
case when the asset bubble incites the price growth, but not in cases of bubbles 
spreading out and an increased exposure of the financial system to an enlarged risk. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that, if the central bank succeeds in noticing an asset 
bubble in time, the instrument at its disposal is more than inefficient for that purpose, 
as the bubble mainly refers to certain segments of the asset market, while monetary 
policy influences the entire economic system. It means that the central bank could 
challenge the recession, the growth of budget deficit as well as the dramatic growth 
of public debt, in case of focusing on eliminating the asset bubble. Finally, empirical 
analyses during the eighties and the nineties confirm the success of reducing interest 
strategies with the aim of injecting liquidity needed in order to eliminate the 
consequences of the bubble burst (Noyer, 2011, pp. 5-8). 
 The public shared the opinion that an effective market will manage to absorb all 
relevant information, as a pillar for causing its reaction, but this assumption was 
evidently wrong. This is due to the fact that the situation in the period from the 
nineties up to 2007 implied a significantly synchronized formation of asset bubbles 
and other financial imbalances, in the USA and the EU, despite the fact that stable 
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Figure 3 
Aggregate asset prices above nominal GDP 
 
Source: Fahr, Motto, Rostagno, Smets and Tristani, 2010; p. 48. 
 
 Academics such as Mishkin (2011) make the difference between two types of 
asset bubbles, which cause different consequences to the industry. The first one, 
which refers to the credit bubble, may be very dangerous, as the crisis confirmed. A 
credit boom, which starts as a result of an expectation connected to economic 
prosperity, increases demand for some assets, hence affecting the price growth. The 
mentioned price growth encourages further crediting of the asset, increases 
demands and affects the price growth. It leads to the formation of the bubble, 
whose break initiates a spiral different than the previous one, jeopardizing the entire 
financial system. In contrast to the first, the second type of the bubble, which refers 
to the irrational exuberance bubble, and starts as a result of an overly optimistic 
expectation, is less dangerous for the financial and the economic system than the 
credit bubble. 
 Negative consequences of the crisis open the debate in literature about the role 
of the central bank – whether the central bank should concentrate on prevention of 
the bubble formation by implementing a stronger monetary policy, or on cleaning 
the consequences of the asset bubble break. The division on the two types of asset 
bubbles is important if we take into account the previously mentioned fact about 
the central bank’s inability to notice the formation of the asset bubble in time, and 
represents the reason for giving priority to the role of the central bank in cleaning the 
consequences of the asset bubble break rather than the prevention of the bubble 
formation. However, recent research results in arguments against the so far 
dominant view that favours the "cleaning" compared to the "prevention", which 
suggests the formation of the credit bubble, making identifying the credit bubble 
easier to identify than the irrational bubble. White (2009, p. 8) notices that the point is 
not in causing bubble break by the central bank and in instigating recessional 
movement, but in intensifying policies directed to restraining credit cycles, in order to 
mitigate the consequences of potential crisis. In order to increase inflation, his 
suggestion is not to change the policy direction as it would certainly be directed in 
that course, but only to highlight the importance of a stronger policy in such 
circumstances. The thing that would be beneficial in that case, and which 
represents an additional argument for the implementation of the mentioned policy, 
is the fact that, after the clearly expressed concern from the holders of monetary 
policy and their determination to act in order to eliminate the problem, the change 
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 Taking into consideration the justified suggestions occurring recently, which are 
connected with the central bank’s obligation to prevent the asset bubble formation, 
the question is which policy would be the most relevant for that purpose. One of the 
possible answers could be found in the use of the so-called micro prudential 
supervisions directed to the limitation of credit bubbles including: capital and 
liquidate requests, fast corrective interventions, detailed monitoring procedures 
connected with risk management and so on. However, this kind of supervision is 
focused on individual institutions and cannot affect the macroeconomic risk 
elimination as a factor with the power of endangering the entire financial system. 
Parallel with that, it would be beneficial to establish macro prudential regulation and 
supervision, as an alternative regulation approach, which would be focused on 
actuality in the credit market. This would refer to the analysis of the role that the bank 
capital has in promoting financial stability, a lower Loan-to-Value Ratio, more 
provisions for repo placement in the period of credit expansions, and so forth. 
On the other hand, monetary policy can be used for eliminating the 
aforementioned balloon, due to the fact that through a "risk-taking channel" it can 
play a significant role in the creation of a property bubble, which was confirmed on 
the basis of numerous theoretical and empirical research studies. Low interest rate 
policies could influence the perception risk, i.e. the risk level in portfolios and asset 
prices. Namely, there are three possible effects by which the risk undertaking 
channel can be operational:  
o Effects which act through the interest rate influence the estimation of the value, 
income and cash flows; 
o Effects which act through relations between the market price and the targeted 
income’s rate; 
o Effects which act through aspects of communicational policy characteristics 
and the central bank’s reaction function (Borio and Zhu, 2008, pp. 8-11). 
 Literature emphasizes many reasons why a low interest rate can influence the 
increase of the undertaking risk. Some authors prove that low interest rates can 
instigate asset managers towards seeking higher incomes in financial institutions, and 
thus towards undertaking more risks (Rhaguram, 2005, 2006). Additionally, it is 
emphasized that low interest rates increase net interest merge and the value of a 
financial institution, raising the capacity for increasing leverages and undertaking risk 
(Shin, Adrian and Song, 2009, pp. 4-8).  
 Taking into account the fact that recent research proves the existence of 
monetary policy channels for undertaking risks, the question is whether we should use 
instruments and measures of monetary policy in order to prevent credit bubbles 
formation, or for cleaning the consequences of bubble breaks. Besides the fact that 
the abovementioned macro prudential supervision is an instrument for the financial 
sector stabilization, Mishkin (2011, pp. 44-46) suggests the use of monetary policy for 
preventing the credit bubble formation (but not for the total asset bubble), as a 
macro prudential policy often does not correspond to the tasks for many reasons. 
One of the most pronounced reasons is the political pressure on macro prudential 
policy as it affects financial institutions directly, unlike the political influence on 
monetary policy which is less strong. Noyer notices (2011, p. 7) that the key lesson 
learned from the crisis is that monetary policy has to be followed by other policies 
with macro prudential nature, in order to decrease inefficiency and prevent the 
asset bubble formation. 
     Implementation of the monetary policy strategy aimed at preventing the credit 
bubble formation is not a simple task. This is due to the existence of some dangers 
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economic activity to a degree higher than the degree desired by momentary 
holders, which implies the existence of a trade-off between the wish to realize 
financial stability and efforts to realize price stability and output stability. 
 Based on interactions between the financial sector and the economy, it may be 
concluded that monetary policy and financial stabilization policy are connected, as 
the monetary policy can affect the financial stability, while realization of the 
financial stability also affects the monetary policy. Orphanides (2010, p. 23) 
concludes that the two goals regarding the price and the financial stability have the 
tendency to strengthen each other; with one being that the interest rate policy 
implemented by the central bank is insufficient to reduce risk in order to ensure the 
financial stability, and then it has to be amended by macro prudential measures. 
Conclusions of theoretical and empirical research related to possible changes in 
monetary policy after dealing with the effects of the Great Recession, are presented 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Possible changes in monetary policy after the Great Recession 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Raising the inflation target 
o Increased scope for expansionary 
monetary policy 
o Decreased ZLB problem 
o Increased flexibility in real wages 
o Insignificant benefits because of rare 
shocks in aggregate demand 
o Increased inflationary expectations 
o Instability in inflationary expectations 
Switching to target of the aggregate price level 
o Reduces inflationary expectations 
o Strategy gets the role of automatic 
stabilizer 
o Stabilization of the inflation rate 
o Smaller variations in output 
o Smaller ZLB problem 
o Pronounced time-inconsistency problem 
o Success depends on the ability to 
convince the public 
The central bank should take care of asset prices and financial stability 
o The consequences of the crisis are 
alleviated in time 
o Application of the approach is an 
important indicator for changing the 
public behaviour 
o Possible stimulation of recessionary trends 
o Bubble cannot be detected in time 
o Inefficient instruments for bubble 
“bursting“ 
o Possible stimulation of recessionary trends 
Source: Author analysis 
 
The impact of the Great Recession on fiscal policy 
The economic crisis restored the central role of fiscal policy right after the recognition 
that monetary policy has reached its limit. That is why fiscal policy and its stimulators 
gained the importance. The crisis subverted some of the principles of monetary and 
fiscal policy, and opened the floor for debating the future principles based on which 
the policy will be determined by the holders. 
 In that sense, a thorough literature review concludes that different authors 
emphasize the importance of different elements of fiscal policy. Consequently, two 
groups of conclusions emerge. Romer (2011, pp. 2-8) formulated four lessons from 
the crisis: 
1. The need to use fiscal instruments for short-term stabilization; 
2. The existence of more effectiveness of fiscal policy than before the crisis; 
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4. The importance of consideration of political economy.  
 The second group of conclusions is connected with conclusions made by 
Blanchard (2009) and Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia and Mauro (2010), highlighting the 
necessity of abstracting lessons: 
1. The importance of fiscal space; 
2. The importance of taxation structure; 
3. The necessity of creating better automatic stabilizers. 
 By refining suggestions in literature, it is possible to reduce them to several key 
principles and lessons abstracted from the crisis, to be addressed, especially 
because they represent a change from the postulates on which rested the fiscal 
policy in the pre-crisis period characterized by widely accepted consensus. Unlike 
the dominant opinion under the frame of consensus in the macroeconomic theory 
before the crisis, which did not suggest the use of fiscal policy for stabilization 
purposes, the spreading of the Great Recession affected the return of the 
Keynesianism approach to fiscal policy. It became evident that monetary authorities 
are powerless in realization of the stabilization goal and in fight against insufficient 
aggregate demand, as it turned out that the zero lower bound problem is more 
serious than it used to be considered. Besides the use of interest rates, the need to 
use other alternatives, which monetary policy has at its disposal, almost 
disappeared. The fiscal policy instrument infringed itself as an unavoidable 
alternative. It caused a wide implementation of discretionary fiscal stimulators, 
making them an unavoidable instrument for short term economic stabilization when 
facing an inadequate demand. 
 Feldstein (2009, pp. 3-10), by emphasizing the fiscal policy revival in the after crisis 
period and by arguing its necessity for stabilization purposes, analyses different 
mechanisms for achieving the mentioned goals, which were used more or less in the 
USA starting from 2007. In that sense, he proves that by using different types of fiscal 
policy instruments, it is possible to influence stabilization goals. One of the ways, 
referring to tax policy, is to use one-time tax relief, as well as other measures resulting 
in the tax reduction, which otherwise increases aggregate demand. Also it is possible 
to use investment tax credits in order to encourage investments in business, as well as 
to introduce the tax changes on dividends and capital gain. Another way is to 
increase public spending, especially productive spending directed to the health 
care system, education, energetics, infrastructure and the help for vulnerable 
groups. 
 Some authors find fault with the orientation of fiscal policy towards the economic 
growth targeting, hoping to generate a wanted effect on employment. Instead of 
that, Tchernev (2011, pp. 10-22) suggests the use of an opposite approach for 
stabilization purposes, i.e. the use of direct demand targeting for workforce, not only 
in a crisis but in all phases of a business cycle, by repeated affirmation of public 
works, different employment programs, tax stimulations, etc. The argument for the 
abovementioned is the fact that the use of important fiscal stimulators aimed at 
economy stabilization did not result in the desired effect because of stagnation of 
the economy growth, the presence of a high rate of unemployment and the 
imparity of incomes, impoverishment and the pressure on the middle class. This leads 
to the conclusion that a review of the macroeconomic stabilization model, a 
change in the approach and concentration on the core of the problem 
personalized in unemployment are required. 
 The precondition for using fiscal stimulators and for the success of the 
abovementioned stabilization fiscal policy depends on fiscal space, which is defined 
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upper limit for indebting, while the IMF’s Board for fiscal policy and development 
defines it as a difference between the current and the maximal level of demand 
which the state can afford without endangering its solvency. Thence was derived 
the conclusion that the importance of ensuring the existence of fiscal space is the 
one of the crucial lessons to be learned from the crisis. The argument for this claim is 
found in the fact that financial rescue, fiscal stimulators and lower incomes during 
the economic crisis resulted in the firmest possible correlation between the public 
debt and GDP as a deficit in developed economies during the last forty years. 
 Sufficient financial space is important for an aggressive response to the 
aggregate demand collapse which occurs in periods of crisis. Its importance is also 
derived from the fact that a high level of fiscal stimulators decreases the costs and 
negative effects of the economic crisis, while the absence of fiscal space limits the 
possibilities of using impetus, and disables the use of fiscal policy in achieving 
stabilization and countercyclical goals. 
 Bearing this in mind, fiscal policy holders have to be aware of the importance of 
creating fiscal space in the expansion phase, so the recession phase would offer 
more opportunities for facing the effects. In that sense, the lower public debt in the 
pre-crisis period compared to the former tax base gives larger fiscal capacity for 
financing stimulators, while the lower average fiscal deficit gives similar effects. 
 So we come to the key question for the fiscal policy creators on a critical level, 
which refers to the necessity of owning information regarding dangerous points for 
public debt sustainability, in order to in a timely manner undertake activities that 
divert the economy from achieving the potential borrowing limits. The second, but 
not less important, challenge is the situation when economy, because of the impact 
of various shocks, gets in the way of explosive indebting, which is why economy has 
to seek the possible options for returning fiscal sustainability. Both challenges will be 
smaller, as the timely commitment to the fiscal space issue is larger (Ostry, Ghosh, 
Kim and Qureshi, 2010, p. 16).  
 Modern empirical research confirms that the countries which used to have 
reasoned fiscal policy before the crisis and with adequate fiscal space managing 
have more possibilities for countercyclical acting during the crisis. On the other hand, 
the countries which misused fiscal space before the crisis will have to be exposed to 
a sanction consisting of the necessity to narrow their future fiscal space and to 
hinder the economic growth, which might lead to a new crisis.  
 Figure 4 confirms the abovementioned claims, and indicates that the events after 
the Great Recession are not a coincidence. This is because, based on the 
comparative analysis of data for selected OECD member countries from 2007 to 
2014, one can easily conclude that the sharpest decline in the economic activity in 
the crisis years is noted in those states that have not in a quality way managed fiscal 
space prior to the onset of the crisis, during 2007 and 2008. For example, of all the 
OECD countries, countries with the lowest fiscal space before the crisis (Italy, 
Greece, Hungary, Portugal, etc.) based on the indicator General Government Net 
Financial Liabilities, are precisely those states where, due to the inability of the 
needed countercyclical functioning of the fiscal policy, the most pronounced 
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Figure 4 
The relationship between fiscal space and the fall in economic activity during the 
crisis in selected OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database, September 2014. 
 
 The world economic crisis resulted in the need for better automatic stabilizers 
because such measures of fiscal policy, which automatically react to changes in 
economic policy without a direct state influence, revitalize negative consequences 
of changes in demand or supply. The importance of automatic stabilizers becomes 
more evident in light of facing the crisis consequences. It becomes clear that 
discretional measures of fiscal policy, aimed at economy stabilization, are faced 
with time delays which noticeably reduce their efficiency and timeliness, and they 
affect an increase of budget deficit, but it does not mean that they should be totally 
eliminated by other anti-cyclic policy measures. It is, actually, just one of the reasons 
which affect the necessity of improving mentioned stabilizers as they do not produce 
negative consequences on public finances qua discretional measures of fiscal 
policy. They act automatically so political decision-making is not needed and there 
are internal and external time delays. 
 Modern research on the issue of automatic stabilizers resulting from the economic 
crisis confirmed once again their importance in mitigating negative effects of the 
economic contraction, i.e. the effects manifested at the labour market, disposable 
income and personal consumption. By using the micro simulation model, which 
explores effects of various shocks on disposable income of households, on 19 EU 
countries Dolls, Fuest and Peichl (2010) concluded that countries with stronger 
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strong stabilizers faced with harder economic contractions and a higher level of 
unemployment. The named is shown in Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5 
Decomposition of the income stabilization coefficient 
 
 The need to foster automatic stabilizers does not exist only in developed countries, 
but also in those with lower incomes, the so-called developing countries. This is 
because empiric studies (Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008) confirm the frequency of pro-cyclic 
fiscal policies. Hence, fostering fiscal stabilizers would strengthen countercyclical 
measures.  
 Two types of stabilizers are noticed. The first type refers to the combination of 
public consumption and public income flexibility depending on the output size, for 
different programs of social insurance, as well as for the nature of the income tax. 
Their effect could be enhanced by increasing public consumption, more progressive 
taxation or stronger social insurance programs. However, the problem is that 
implementation of these stabilizers causes an increase of public consumption, and 
the reduction of economic efficiency. Further progression in income tax has limited 
influence on stabilizers, but it can undermine economic efficiency. Therefore, 
strengthening automatic stabilizers without increasing public spending is particularly 
challenging. 
 The second type of stabilizers is very interesting, as they do not refer to the public 
consumption increase as the abovementioned stabilizers, but can be implemented 
through the change of tax or public expense policies, or through the creation of 
fiscal rules. The conclusions made based on recent findings result in several 
recommended measures that should be considered, and which may result in 
realization of macroeconomic stabilization goals, without accompanying negative 
effects.  
 Baunsgaard and Symansky (2009, p. 18) recommend implementation of the 
following measures: 
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o Assessing the corporate income tax on the basis of estimated current income 
rather than last year’s actual income; 
o Developing alternative safety net mechanisms in countries without a 
comprehensive unemployment insurance (e.g., targeted cash transfer programs 
in emerging market economies and public works programs in low-income 
countries); 
o Designing fiscal rules that would avoid the need for discretionary actions that 
would offset the automatic stabilizers (e.g., targeting the cyclically adjusted 
fiscal balance). 
 Also, Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia and Mauro (2010), as well as Baunsgaard and 
Symansky (2009) recommend, as a reaction to the crisis, a serious discussion about 
the approach in implementation of interim policies which refer to income (tax 
policy) and expenses (transfer public expenditures) as a response to 
macroeconomic movements. The mentioned approach includes an implementation 
of an interim tax policy, such as tax exemptions for households with low incomes, or 
policies aimed at companies as beneficiaries.  
In relation to public expenditures, in order to avoid remuneration for the fiscal 
irresponsibility from previous years the following is recommended: potential 
implementation of interim transfers whose beneficiaries would be households with 
low incomes and limited liquidity, providing a more complete insurance in case of 
unemployment if the unemployment rate grows above a certain level, 
automatisation of the transfer system from the central bank to federal units in case of 
serious recession, and so on. 
 Theoretical and empirical studies related to possible changes in fiscal policy after 
dealing with the effects of the Great Recession, are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Possible changes in fiscal policy after the Great Recession 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Stronger reliance on stabilizing fiscal policy 
o Powerful instrument for managing 
aggregate demand pressures 
o Open space for the implementation of the 
fiscal stimulus 
o Increased risk of tendencies to inflationary 
policies 
o The risk that instead of being 
countercyclical, fiscal policy causes 
creation of the cycles 
o Crowding out effect 
The increased importance of fiscal space 
o Increased possibility of using anti-cyclical 
fiscal policy 
o Greater capacity for fiscal stimulus 
o Reduced cost of dealing with the crisis 
o Reduced possibility of discretionary policy 
in “normal conditions“ 
o High opportunity cost 
Greater importance of automatic stabilizers 
o Lack of the time inconsistency problem 
o No external and internal delays 
o Political decisions not required 
o Efficiency is reduced 





Even the existing economic crisis seriously undermines confidence in monetary policy 
holders and requires a review of certain segments on which the monetary policy 
theory rested, although most parts of it will still remain unchanged. However, under 




Business Systems Research Vol. 6 No. 1 / March 2015 
seems almost certain that there modifications of the strategic framework of 
monetary policy will be made. Raising the inflation target would certainly influence 
the increase of flexibility of monetary policy in the face of severe adverse shocks. In 
this way monetary policy, on one hand, would become an important instrument for 
the implementation of countercyclical policies, while on the other hand, it would 
reduce the scope of the ZLB problem, which is much stronger than it used to be 
considered to be before the crisis. Thereby, the costs of macroeconomic stabilization 
would be lower.  
 The probability that the strategy of flexible inflation targeting will be replaced by 
the strategy of aggregate price level targeting is lower. However, if it comes to that, 
there will be an open space for a more widespread application of discretionary 
monetary policy, which in this case would represent automatic stabilizers and in 
comparison to inflation targeting it would reduce the variation in output. 
 In the upcoming period, central banks will, instead of putting focus on cleaning 
the consequences of an asset bubble break, direct their activities on the bubble 
formation prevention. In that regard, a micro prudential supervision will be 
implemented aiming at the credit bubble limitation, macro prudential regulation 
and supervision which will monitor situation on the credit market, the so-called 
channel for undertaking risk of monetary policy. 
 The Great Recession changes basic principles on which fiscal policy rested in the 
pre-crisis period, returning it its central role as an economic policy instrument. It 
becomes evident that fiscal policy has to represent a crucial and unavoidable 
instrument for short-term economy stabilization while the economy is being faced 
with insufficient demand. This, on the other hand, means that it is expected that 
holders of fiscal policy in the future will be more likely to choose the application of 
discretionary fiscal policy than they used to be. But, the precondition of stabilization 
fiscal policy success, more than it used to be considered in the pre-crisis period, 
depends on the fiscal space size and on the ways of automatic stabilizers creation. 
Stabilizers may be twofold, from a combination of public consumption and public 
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